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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions of jurisdiction concerning protection of cultural 
property1 are marginally addressed in conventions relative to the 
international protection of cultural property since only the ter-
ritoriality theory is relied upon either explicitly or implicitly in the 
various relevant texts.2 The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,3 
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(Indiana, 1964); LL.M. (John Marshall, 1966); S.J.D. (George Washington, 1973). 
1. The term "cultural property" is used herein as defined in the UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, art. l, reprinted in 10 l.L.M. 289 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as UNESCO Convention]. 
2. None of the major international agreements concerned solely with protection of 
cultural property contain detailed, explicit statements regarding jurisdiction. However, a 
reliance on the territorial theory of jurisdiction may be found in or inferred from the provi-
sions of these relevant conventions: Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific In-
stitutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, T.S. No. 899, 167 L.N.T.S. 
289 [hereinafter cited as Roerich Pact]; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter cited as 1954 
Hague Convention]; European Cultural Convention, Dec. 19, 1954, 218 U.N.T.S. 139 
[hereinafter cited as European Cultural Convention]; European Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Archaeological Heritage, May 6, 1969, 66 Europ. T.S. 736 [hereinafter cited as 
European Archaeological Convention]; UNESCO Convention, supra note 1; Organization of 
American States: Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Ar-
tistic Heritage of the American Nations, OAS G.A. Res. 210 (Vl-0/76) (1976), reprinted in 
15 l.L.M. 1350 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OAS Convention], Convention Concerning Pro-
tection of World Cultural Property and Natural Heritage, U.N. Doc. A!CONF. 48/PC/11/Add. 
3, 15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as World Heritage Convention]. 
3. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/122 (not yet in force), art. 303 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Law of 
the Sea]. Article 303 contains only a limited jurisdictional statement regarding the contiguous 
zone defined in article 33. Removal of property from the contiguous zone without the con-
sent of the coastal state is presumed to infringe upon that state's territory in violation of 
article 3 of the convention. In limiting the scope of the article to the contiguous zone, the 
Convention includes no rule governing property found beyond the zone. Also, paragraph 
2 of article 303 limits the scope of a coastal state's jurisdiction over cultural property found 
within the contiguous zone to prevent the removal of the property from the zone for the 
purpose of controlling traffic in antiquities only. The question of jurisdiction over property 
left in situ for study or other purposes is left unresolved. Paragraph 3 further limits article 
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however, contains two clauses dealing with protection of cultural 
property, including applicable theories of jurisdiction,4 and what 
may be deemed guidelines for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction.5 
Scholarly writings on the subject jurisdiction are also limited, 
though the subject of international protection of cultural property 
has been treated extensively and in depth.6 
Theories of jurisdiction, choice of law policies and rules, and 
303 by excluding, from the scope of the article, property subject to the rights of identifiabl~ 
owners or the rules of admiralty. For a further discussion of the articles contained in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea relevant to protection of cultural property, see Note, 
Archaeological and Historical Objects: The International Legal Implications of UNCLOS III, 
22 VA.J. INT'L L. 777 (1982).Seealso, e.g., H. CRANE-MILLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MARINE 
ARCHAEOLOGY (1973) (examination of national and international maritime rights). 
4. For the position of the United States, see RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised), (Tentative Draft No. l), considered by the ALI in June 1980, 
reviewed in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 954 (1980);Tentative Draft No. 2, considered by the ALI in May 
1981, reviewed in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1981); Tentative Draft No. 3, considered by the ALI 
in May 1982, Part IV - Jurisdiction,§§ 401, 419-20, 431-33, reviewed in 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 655 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Draft 
Code]. For the writings of scholars on international law, see e.g., E. LAUTERPACHT, Qp. 
PENHEIM: INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-79 (1952); 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 665 (1965); 
6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-253 (1968); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
531-653 (3d ed. 1971); G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 183-283 (1976) (for the 
writings of scholars on international law). For international criminal law scholars, see, e.g., 
I M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. VI 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as EXTRADITION]. For a pioneer in the area of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction and conflicts of criminal jurisdiction, see H.F. DONNEDIEU DE V ABRES, INTRODUC-
TION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1922), H.F. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRIN-
CIPES MODERNES DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1928). See also Szaszy' Conflict of Laws Rules 
in International Criminal Law and Municipal Criminal Law in Western and Socialist Coun-
tries, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135 
(1973); Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 446 
(1962) (examination of theories of jurisdiction for international criminal law). 
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW§ 6 (1971). For contemporary 
U.S. scholarly writings, see e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962); 
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1963); H. GOODRICH & E. SCALES, HAND-
BOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1964); R. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); A. LEFLAR, 
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (1968); W .L. REESE & M. ROSENBURG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1978); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1980) 
(background, usage and commentaries on conflict of laws). 
6. Cf ART LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL (L. DuBoff ed. 1975); L. DUBOFF, THE 
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (1977)[hereinafter cited as DESKBOOK]; Bator, An Essay on the Interna-
tional Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982); Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the 
Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 537 (1971); Note, The Protection of Art 
in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1974); Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered 
Management of International Conflict Over Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS L.J.1051 (1976); 
Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 
HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1976); Merryman, A Course in Art and the Law, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551 
(1974). See also The Penal Protection of Works of Art (Proceedings of the International In-
stitute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, 1983). 
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methods of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction are threshold issues 
which should be addressed by the drafters of any international 
convention 7 and, in particular, by the drafters of instruments con-
cerning international protection of cultural property (due to the 
transnational nature of the issues to which such instruments ad-
dress themselves). Regrettably, the issue of jurisdiction in inter-
national agreements concerning protection of cultural property has 
never been sufficiently addressed and, thus, deserves further 
consideration. 
The failure of any international agreement to adopt specific 
theories of jurisdiction or to at least provide some policy or rules 
regarding conflicts of jurisdiction creates problems with respect 
to the dual jurisdictional questions of legislation and enforcement. 
Ultimately, the recognition of foreign judicial judgments is ques-
tioned. The very nature of international protection of cultural prop-
erty further compounds the problems where an international agree-
ment does not contain explicit jurisdictional provisions.8 This arises 
7. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE 
145 (1980) (theories of jurisdiction applicable to international crimes are discussed in article 
III of the Enforcement Part) [hereinafter referred to as DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
CODE]. The Code was presented at the Vlth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, (Caracas, Venezuela, 1980) U.N. Doc. E/1980/L.1. For commentaries on 
the Draft International Criminal Code, see 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, No. 
3-4 (1981). 
8. The complex jurisdictional problems often encountered in an action at law to pro-
tect cultural property may be illustrated by Union of India v. Norton Simon Foundation. 
In 1951, the Swapuran Nataraja, a 10th century bronze representation of the Lord Shiva 
as Lord of the Cosmic Dance, was excavated in India. By the laws of India, this bronze is 
a legal entity capable of owning property, suing, and being sued. The image, while being 
restored in 1956, was stolen and a copy substituted in its place. In 1967, the Nataraja came 
into the possession of a Bombay art collector and was displayed by him. 
Several years later, the statue was exported to the United States and sold by Ben Heller, 
a noted art dealer, to the Norton Simon Foundation. An export permit for "a 10th or 11th 
century dancing shiva" was obtained when the bronze left India. In 1973, the Nataraja was 
loaned to the Metropolitan Museum of Art for an exhibit. The Metropolitan notified the 
government of India of its plan to exhibit the piece. Due to the protests of the Indian govern-
ment and the intervention of the Department of State, the Metropolitan agreed not to exhibit 
the idol. 
In late 1974, India filed suit in England, New York (Ben Heller's domicile), and Los 
Angeles (the domicile of Norton Simon and the Norton Simon Foundation). Criminal pro-
ceedings were instituted against the original conservateur and his several accomplices. The 
complaint alleged a conspiracy to steal the Nataraja and traced the statue's path from the 
alleged theft to its sale to Norton Simon. India demanded return of the bronze, $500,000 
damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering, $1 million in punitive damages, and 
costs incurred in locating the idol and litigating its return. Damages of $4 million were 
demanded in the event the Nataraja was not returned. 
The Norton Simon Foundation denied that India had either title or rights to the im-
4
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essentially because relevant international instruments either 
distinguish or blur the distinction between the contexts of war and 
peace, and the spectrum between war and peace (involving different 
levels of hostility). Some treaties are applicable only during times 
of armed conflict;9 others are applicable during times of peace but 
also contain provisions regarding periods of belligerent occupation;10 
still others do not specifically state that they apply exclusively 
during times of peace, although such exclusivity may be inferred, 11 
and others apply in time of both war and peace.12 Rules governing 
jurisdiction and policies affecting choice of law differ significantly 
age. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs should be denied relief by the doctrines of 
unclean hands, in pari delicto, waiver, and estoppel. With reference to the theft of the 
Nataraja, the defendants argued that India should be estopped from recovery by their own 
inaction. Defendants further argued that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the bronze's 
whereabouts since 1965 when it was displayed openly and notoriously in Bombay. Therefore, 
by virtue of English, Indian, New York, and California statutes of limitation, India had aban-
doned title to the object. 
The defendants also argued that laches barred the suit because India had failed to take 
action to recover the Nataraja within a reasonable time after it was put on notice of the 
object's location. Norton Simon had purchased the object in reliance on this non-action and, 
therefore, plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from bringing suit. Finally, defendants 
alleged that the laws of India, if construed in the manner urged by the plaintiffs, were con-
trary to United States public policy and not applicable in an American court. See Union 
of India v. Norton Simon Foundation, No. 74 Civ. 5331. (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (second amended 
complaint); No. CV 74-3581-RJK. (C.D.Cal. 1976). 
The case was eventually settled out of court. See No. CV 74-3581-RJK, Stipulation and 
Order (C.D. Cal. 1976). Plaintiffs obtained a document quit-claiming all the defendants' right, 
title and interest in and to the Nataraja. In exchange, India permitted the object to remain 
in the possession of the foundation for ten years and to be exhibited in any country with 
which India had diplomatic relations. As a result of Norton Simon and the foundation's right 
to counterclaim against Ben Heller, the art dealer conveyed numerous art works and a sum 
of money to the foundation. 
For a more detailed discussion of this case, see DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 109-14. 
9. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (effective Feb. 
2, 1956) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Geneva Convention (IV)]; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, adopted June 8, 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirm-
ation of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I of Aug. 15, 1977, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Protocol I]; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 
12, 1949, adopted June 8, 1977, by .the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation of Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 
Annex II of Aug. 15, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol II]. 
10. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; UNESCO Convention, supra note 
1, art. 11. 
11. European Cultural Convention, supra note 2; European Archaeological Conven-
tion, supra note 2; OAS Convention, supra note 2. 
12. Roerich Pact, supra note 2, art. 1. 
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depending on a peacetime or a wartime context. The absence of 
differentiated specificity in relevant international instruments as 
to contextual application, applicable rules of law, and choice of law 
policies and rules deprives the area of international protection of 
cultural property of much needed clarity, uniformity, and certainty 
of outcome. 
International protection of cultural property, whether ap-
plicable to the context of armed conflict or peace, is achieved 
through two means. The first is criminal in nature and involves the 
prohibition, prosecution, and punishment of destruction of cultural 
property, pillage, and theft. The second is civil in nature and in-
volves the restitution of cultural property to rightful owners who 
may be either states, individuals, or legal entities. Policies and rules 
governing jurisdiction and choice of law necessarily differ with 
respect to criminal prosecution and civil action. Consequently, the 
relevant international conventions should distinguish in their ap-
propriate provisions between these two kinds of legal action ap-
plicable to the protection of cultural property. Such provisions would 
serve the interests of clarity, uniformity, certainty, and predict-
ability of outcome, as well as effective enforcement, regardless of 
the forum deemed competent to adjudicate such actions. 
It must also be noted that another jurisdictionally-related prob-
lem arises from the fact that the international legislator has not 
consistently expressed the legal nature of violations of international 
protection of cultural property. In the context of armed conflicts, 
certain violations are war crimes, and are thus international crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction, as well as territorial jurisdiction 
as discussed below. In the context of peace, there is no indication 
from the international legislator as to whether certain violations 
can also be deemed international crimes. Furthermore, neither the 
nature of the violation (i.e., an international crime, a transnational 
crime, or a common crime)13 nor the appropriate applicable jurisdic-
tional theory is identified (e.g., universality and territoriality for 
international crimes, active or passive personality and protected 
interest, territoriality for transnational crimes, and any or all of 
the above for common crimes). 
International protection of cultural property in the context of 
the regulation of armed conflicts, as stated above, makes violation 
13. Bassiouni, The Common Characteristics of International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT'L L. 25 (1983). 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss2/3
286 Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 10:281 
of the defined prohibited conduct a war crime, thus an international 
crime, to which universality and territoriality of jurisdiction apply. 
The competent forum is therefore either an international criminal 
court, should one be established (even on an ad hoc basis), or national 
military tribunals, which compound jurisdictional problems with 
respect to civilians who may not be subject to its general 
jurisdiction.14 As an international crime, it would entail the ap-
plicability of the doctrine aut dedere aut J'udicare which implies the 
duty to prosecute or extradite, the duty of states to lend judicial 
assistance and cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, punish-
ment, and, in general, the enforcement of these aspects.15 All these 
measures do not apply to non-international crimes, unless specifical-
ly established by conventional or customary international criminal 
law. Thus, the provisions of the relevant conventions are applicable 
in peacetime, unless the prohibitions in question are deemed to be 
in the nature of international crimes. Otherwise they will be en-
forced by the ordinary courts of general jurisdiction of the in-
terested states, whether they be criminal or civil, and are not likely 
to benefit from the expanded scope and scheme of international en-
forcement including the broader jurisdictional bases recognized for 
international crimes.16 
The lack of explicit jurisdictional provisions in conventions deal-
ing with international protection of cultural property also raises 
conflict of laws issues. As the primary conventions dealing with 
international protection of cultural property contain no explicit 
jurisdictional theories, states must resort to national rules govern-
ing jurisdiction and choice of law. Thus, which particular state may 
assert jurisdiction or has priority of jurisdiction, and which body 
of law should be applied to violations of international agreements 
protecting cultural property, remains internationally unspecified. 
This situation frustrates, inter alia, the cooperation between states 
which is so necessary for the effective protection of cultural prop-
14. See U.C.M.J. arts. 1-6 and 16-21, 10 U.S.C. § 101, § 802 art. 2 (1982) and e.g., Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956), and O'Callaghan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); see also infra 
note 178. 
15. For the concept of aut dedere aut judicare, see I EXTRADITION, supra note 4, chap. 
II, and Costello, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle of "Aut Dedere 
Aut Ju~icare," 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483 (1975). The concept is predicated on Hugo Grotius' 
maxim "aut dedere aut punire." See H. GROTIUS DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, Book II, Chap. XX!, 
§ 5(1) (1625). 
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erty and, particularly, to the prevention and control of illicit traffic 
in cultural property. 
The ensuing analysis explores some of the problems created 
by the absence of specific jurisdictional provisions in international 
agreements protecting cultural property. 
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE 
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
As stated above and discussed below, the applicable interna-
tional conventions distinguish their contextual applicability either 
explicitly or implicitly i.e., during armed conflicts (war), or at other 
times (peace). The distinction is no longer helpful or useful because 
the question concerns not the context, but the object of the 
protection.17 Since archaeological, national, historical, and other prop-
erty of national and cultural heritage are the intended objects of 
international protection, there is no conceptual difference in the 
legal nature of the protection. The differences concern the types 
of protective measures and sanctions which should apply, such as 
those measures applicable to individuals acting in their private or 
personal capacity, and those applicable to states and individuals 
acting in their official capacity or pursuant to state-sponsored policy. 
The applicable conventions do not make such distinctions, but reflect 
the very questionable historical division of the international law 
of war and peace. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the rele-
vant applicable international instruments in light of those 
distinctions. 
A. PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING 
PERIODS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
The protection of cultural property during armed conflict has 
evolved over the relatively short period of the last two centuries.18 
16. I EXTRADITION, supra note 4, chap. II and supra note 13. 
17. Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Interna-
tional Protection of Human Rights, - YALE STUD. WORLD PUBLIC ORDER - (1983). 
18. For centuries, the laws of war allowed belligerents to confiscate or destroy all 
enemy property, public or private. The ancient Romans originated the concept of "booty." 
Booty was property confiscated in accordance with the international rules of war and was 
"a legitimate by-product of war." DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 129. See also TRUEUE, ART 
PLUNDER (1961). On the regulation of armed conflicts and relative conventions, see D. 
SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1981); L. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1972); M. GREENSPAN, MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1959). 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss2/3
288 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 10:281 
It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that cultural property 
was deemed exempt from those aspects of war which permit plunder 
and destruction of enemy property .19 In 1758, Emheric de Vattel 
stated the emerging rule concerning the conduct of belligerents 
engaged in combat on foreign territory which prohibited wanton 
destruction and pillage of cultural property.20 De Vattel felt that 
artistic treasures which "do honour to human society" should be 
spared from the ravages of war, and temples, tombs, public 
buildings, and "all works of a remarkable beauty" were to be 
preserved as far as possible.21 
Such ideals, however, were lost on the rulers and military 
leaders of Europe of that time. Napoleon systematically removed 
art treasures from countries occupied by France during the 
Napoleonic Wars.22 After Waterloo, at the negotiations for the Con-
vention of Paris in 1815, France attempted to include a clause allow-
ing for retention of confiscated property in Paris.23 Nevertheless, 
the Duke of Wellington, speaking for the Allies, stated that 
systematic looting of art by a conquering army was contrary to prin-
ciples of justice and to the rules of modern warfare.24 The Allies 
ordered the return of both confiscated property, and property ac-
quired by France through treaty, to their countries of origin.25 
While the treaties of peace subsequent to the Napoleonic Wars 
did not expressly provide for the return of looted art, 26 the concept 
of protecting cultural property had evolved from a theory developed 
19. See .Case of the Vessel Marquis de Somereules, 1812 Stew. Adm. 482. During the 
War of 1812, a ship carrying works of art belonging to the Philadelphia Museum of Art 
was captured by the British Navy and the art objects aboard were held as prizes of war. 
The Canadian court hearing the case held that objects of artistic value on the ship must 
be returned to their owner. The court reasoned that art was a part of the common heritage 
of mankind and, thus, protected from seizure during war. 
20. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 364 (1829 ed.). 
21. Id. at 433. 
22. Napoleon reasoned that all Europeans shared a common heritage, but that France 
was the most appropriate center for the great works of art. See Note, The Protection of 
Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 691-93 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Art in Transnational Law]. In order to give his "acquisitions" legitimacy, Napoleon enacted 
treaties containing art concession clauses. See Armistice Between France and the Pope, June 
23, 1796, Martens, Recueil General des Traites de Paix 121 (1798), 53 Parry's T.S. 125; Treaty 
Between France and the Pope, Feb. 19, 1791, 6 Martens Recueil Des Principaux Traites 
(2d) 241. 
23. Art in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 693. 
24. Id. 
25. To have allowed a distinction between the two means by which Napoleon acquired 
works of art would have made the practice of "looting by treaty" legitimate in future armed 
conflicts. DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 133; A rt in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 693. 
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by scholars to a practiced legal principle. A brief analysis of the 
provisions contained in international agreements over the ensuing 
150 years firmly established that the protection of cultural prop-
erty is a basic and fundamental rule in the regulation of armed con-
flict. Its purpose is to preserve what can now be called the in-
alienable right of all peoples to their natural cultural heritage.27 
Certain international instruments concerning the regulation of 
armed conflicts establish that certain violations of cultural property 
rights explicitly or implicitly constitute an international crime, 
under conventional or customary international law. As such, the 
violators are subject to criminal prosecution and punishment under 
the theories of universality and territoriality in accordance with 
customary international law. Although the conventions referred to 
below do not necessarily provide for a specific jurisdictional base, 
subsequent interpretation and practice establish it. The following 
is a brief discussion of some of the more relevant texts. 
The Lieber Code, adopted in the United States in 1863,28 stated 
that only public property was subject to confiscation and that 
cultural property was not to be considered public property for pur-
poses of confiscation or appropriation.29 In no way could such prop-
erty be seized, sold, given away, wantonly destroyed, damaged, or 
privately appropriated until such time as a peace treaty determined 
the ultimate ownership of the property.30 
26. The Allies considered it preferable to reach a private agreement with Louis XVIII 
prior to the conclusion of the peace treaties, rather than to force a humiliating public ac-
quiesence on him. Attempts to retrieve stolen art were, therefore, disjointed and sporadic. 
Art in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 693. 
27. A number of human right documents reflect the principle that all people have 
the right to participate in and enjoy their cultural heritage. See Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/71 at 70 (1948) (every person has a right 
to own property and may not be arbitrarily deprived thereof; every person has a right to 
freely participate in the cultural life of the community and to enjoy the arts); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp. 
16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/62 (1966) (all people have a right to freely pursue their social and 
cultural development; all persons have an equal right to enjoyment of social and cultural 
rights, to participate in cultural life, and to benefit from the protection of moral and material 
interests resulting from any literacy or artistic production of which that person is the author). 
28. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Order No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, Apr. 24, 1863 
(Lieber Code), 2 F. Lieber, Contributions to Political Science, Including Lectures on the Con-
stitution of the United States and Other Writings 245 (1881). The code contains regulations 
for the proper conduct of United States troops during wartime. 
29. Id. art. XXXI. 
30. Id. art. XXXVI. See also art. XXXV (stating that classical works of art, libraries, 
scientific collections or precious instruments must be secured against all avoidable harm). 
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The 187 4 Conference of Brussels,31 although never ratified, 
declared that pillage was expressly prohibited and that enemy prop-
erty could not be seized or destroyed unless militarily necessary.32 
Further, property belonging to institutions devoted to the arts, 
whether privately or publicly-owned, or privately or publicly-funded, 
was to be treated as private property and as such, seizure or 
destruction thereof was prohibited and should be prosecuted. 33 
The Hague Conventions of 189934 and 190735 on the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land incorporated, in large part, the concepts 
embodied in the Conference of Brussels. Both set out extensive pro-
visions for the protection of cultural property in certain articles 
discussed below. Pillage is formally prohibited by article XXIIl(g) 
which prohibits destruction or seizure of enemy property unless 
imperatively demanded by the necessity of war.36 Private property 
cannot be confiscated.37 Attack or bombardment of undefended 
towns, villages, or buildings, including cultural targets, is 
prohibited. 38 
Three provisions of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions deal 
specifically with protection of cultural property. Article XX VII im-
poses a duty on signatory states to take steps to spare buildings 
dedicated to art, science, and religion and, further, imposes a duty 
to give notice to the enemy by marking such buildings. An occupy-
ing power must administer all public institutions, including 
museums, in such a manner as to preserve them.39 In an even 
broader provision, all seizure or destruction of, or intentional 
31. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
(Declaration of Brussels), adopted by the Conference of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, 4 Martens 
Nouveau Recueil (2d) 219. 
32. Id. arts. XIII(g), XXXIX. 
33. Id. art. VIII. 
34. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (1899), T.S. No. 403, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d) 949 [hereinafter 
cited as 1899 Hague Convention (II)]. 
35. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277 (1907), T.S. No. 539, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 461 [hereinafter cited 
as 1907 Hague Convention (VI)]. 
36. 1899 Hague Convention (II), supra note 34, and 1907 Hague Convention (IV), supra 
note 35, common art. 47. Every provision protecting cultural property in international 
agreements is limited by the Rule of Necessity, which permits protection to the extent that 
the subject of protection is not used for military purposes or situated so close to a military 
objective as to render protection militarily impracticable. 
37. Id. common art. 46. 
38. Id. common art. 55. 
39. Id. common art. 56. 
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damage to institutions of arts and sciences, historic monuments, 
or works of art or science is forbidden and should be subject to 
legal proceedings.40 
Two other international instruments deal specifically with pro-
tection of cultural property from bombardment in time of war. The 
Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time 
of War,41 also enacted at The Hague in 1907, requires that all 
necessary precautions be taken to spare historic monuments and 
edifices devoted to worship, art, science, and charity.42 Although 
never formally ad9pted, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare reiterate 
that historic monuments and other cultural institutions should be 
spared from bombing during hostilities.43 
The Hague Conventions, however, failed to prevent widespread 
damage and destruction to cultural property during World War I, 
including the bombing of the Rheims Cathedral and the burning 
of the library at Louvain. At the end of the war, a number of peace 
treaties established reparations for confiscations of private prop-
erty, including cultural property. Among them, the Treaty of 
Versailles44 mandated that art objects taken by Germany both in 
the First World War and in the Franco-Prussian War be returned 
to their country of origin.45 Article 297(a) required Germany to cease 
holding confiscated property and to restore it to its owners, if still 
extant in specie, and to provide agreed-to compensation in lieu of 
restitution.46 A Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was established to ad-
judicate compensation to civilians for confiscated property.47 Ger-
many was also required to indemnify all bona fide third-party pur-
chasers who might be injured by the restitution.48 While not a party 
40. Id. 
41. Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351 (1907), T.S. No. 542, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 604. 
42. Id. art. V. 
43. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, drafted by a Commission of Juries at The Hague, 
Dec. 1922 - Feb. 1923, art. XXV, 17 AM. J. lNT'L L. SUPP. 245 (1923). 
44. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 
323, 1919 For. Rel. (Paris Peace Conference XIII), 55, 740, 743, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter cited 
as Treaty of Versailles]. 
45. Article 247 required Germany to replace the books, manuscripts, and incunabula 
in corresponding number and value after the destruction of the Lou vain Library. 
46. Id. art. 245; see also Art in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 699. 
47. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 44, art. 304. 
48. Id. art. 297. Article 6 of the Annex to Section IV of the treaty, entitled Property, 
Rights and Interests, makes Germany responsible for conservation of confiscated property 
up to the time of restoration. 
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to the Treaty of Versailles, the United States did sign the Treaty 
of Berlin,49 which contained similar provisions. A similar Mixed 
Claims Commission was established in a subsequent treaty.so 
The Treaty of Sevress1 between the Allies and Turkey ordered 
Turkey to restore all seized trophies, archives, historical souvenirs 
or works of art taken prior to October 1914.s2 Article 422 also re-
quired the return of all objects of religious, archaeological, historical 
or artistic interest, taken prior to August 1914, to the government 
of the territory from which they were taken within twelve months 
after the enforcement date of the treaty.s3 This treaty, however, 
never entered into effect. 
In 1935, the United States initiated an inter-American treaty 
called the Roerich Pact.s• The treaty declared that movable 
monuments may not be treated as spoils of war.ss 
Unfortunately, international agreement did little more to stop 
damage to cultural property in World War II than it had in World 
War I. The Third Reich systematically plundered the cultural prop-
erty of Europe through the Einsatzstab der Dienststellen des 
Reichleiters Rosenberg, a Reich department established to gather 
objects d'art from all over Europe for "protection."s6 
The prosecutions of the major Nazi war criminals firmly 
established confiscation, destruction, and damage to cultural prop-
erty as a war crime subject to prosecution and punishment,s7 and 
49. Treaty of Berlin 1921, 42 Stat. 1939 (1921), T.S. No. 658, 12 U.N.T.S. 192. 
50. Agreement for a Mixed Commission, done Aug. 10, 1922, T.S. No. 665, 26 L.N.T.S. 
358. 
51. Treaty of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 179-81 (1921) [hereinafter 
cited as Treaty of Sevres]. 
52. Id. art. 420. 
53. Id. Article 432 also provided for the preservation and return of the contents of 
the Russian Archaeological Institute at Istanbul, initially to be surrendered to the Allies 
in order to safeguard the rights of Russia. 
54. Roerich Pact, supra note 2. 
55. Id. art. 1. 
56. Through a program of confiscation instituted in December 1941, 69,619 homes in 
Western Europe were plundered (mostly Jewish), including 38,000 in Paris alone, and 26, 
984 railroad cars were needed to transport the objects to Germany. A list of 21,902 con-
fiscated pieces was compiled. U.S. v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69, 157 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 
Nuremberg Judgment]. Four thousand "degenerate" post-impressionist works were destroyed 
when the barn in which they were housed was needed to store grain. DESKBOOK, supra note 
6, at 144. See also TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL (U.S.G.P.O. 33 Vols.1948) (provides record of the trial proceedings, including official 
documents, judgments and sentence of the defendants). 
57. Nuremberg Judgment describes the acts of the Einsatztab Rosenberg as "Pillage 
of Public and Private Property," and cites violations of articles 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, and 56 
of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), 6 F.R.D. 120, infra note 61. 
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provided the first truly international enforcement of the inter-
national law protecting cultural property. The London Charter of 
August 8, 1945,58 establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, provided 
that "plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity" was a crime punishable under the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal.59 Pillage as extensive as that practiced by the Nazis was 
held to violate article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), and 
the Nuremberg Judgment found the defendants guilty of violations 
of international treaties, including the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions, and the Treaty of Versailles.60 The Tribunal thus found 
the crimes enumerated in the Charter to be war crimes recognized 
under international law. Specifically, Alfred Rosenberg, director of 
the Einstatzstab Rosenberg, was found guilty of war crimes based 
on his responsibility for the plunder of Europe.61 
In an attempt to control looted articles after World War II, 
the United States, Great Britain, and France signed a Statement 
of Policy with Respect to the Control of Looted Articles.62 The three 
nations agreed to take measures to seek out looted articles and pre-
vent their exportation, to encourage liberated countries to provide 
lists of looted articles not yet recovered, to disseminate the lists 
to art dealers and museums, and to alert the general public in order 
to encourage the return of looted articles to their rightful owners.63 
58. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis, Aug. 18, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 
[hereinafter cited as London Charter]. 
59. 59 Stat. at 1547. Other war crimes were prosecuted under Control Council Ordinance 
No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes (Berlin, Dec. 20, 1945) Official Gazette 
of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Jan. 31, 1946, which repeated, in article II(l)(b), 
the definition of war crimes contained in the London Charter article 6(d). Article II(3) of 
the ordinance provided for delivery of property forfeited or subject to restitution by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal to the Control Council for disposition. T. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
No. 10 (U.S.G.P.O. 1949). 
60. Nuremberg Judgment, supra notes 56, 57 and note 59. See also DESKBOOK, supra 
note 6, at 144-64 (analysis of trials conducted during World War II). 
61. See E. DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966), Trial of Alfred Rosenberg at 
125; and R. CoNOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983), Trial of Alfred Rosenberg at 377. 
62. Paris, July 8, 1946, reprinted in DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 161-62. American public 
policy requires the return of misappropriated property. On January 28, 1947, the State-War 
Navy Coordinating Committee signed a manifesto entitled Return of Looted Object of Art 
to Countries of Origin, which called for the return in reiteration of the Paris Statement of 
Policy with Respect to Control of Looted Articles. DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 160. 
63. Germany was not the only country to confiscate works of art. The Third Army 
of the United States under General George Patton removed a number_ of masterpieces from 
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After World War II, developments in the protection of cultural 
property during times of armed conflict were reflected in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War.64 Article 53, however, states 
only that any destruction of real or personal property, whether 
publicly or privately owned, is prohibited.65 Unfortunately, the 
fourth 1949 Geneva Convention does not reiterate some of the more 
detailed and explicit language of the Brussels Conference and the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, though it makes certain viola-
tions a "grave breach" (i.e., a war crime).66 
As a result, it became necessary to adopt a convention 
specifically for the protection of cultural property during armed 
conflict. This was accomplished in the 1954 Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.67 This 
convention attempts to broaden the scope of the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions by taking into account the events of World Wars 
I and II, and by incorporating certain provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions to arrive at a truly effective and comprehensive agree-
ment on the protection of cultural property during hostilities.68 As 
such, the 1954 convention applies to conflicts of an international 
character, as well as to conflicts of a non-international character.69 
The convention also accounts for the possibility of damage to 
cultural property prior to a declaration of war.70 In addition, it pro-
vides for protective measures to commence during times of peace 
in order that such protective mechanisms be in place at the outset 
of hostilities. 71 
Finally, the 1977 Protocols !72 and Il73 Additional to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions contain provisions for the protection of cultural 
the Kaiser Friedrich Museum and the Nationalsgalerie in Berlin. The works were taken 
on the grounds that the paintings needed protection from the Russians and were entrusted 
to the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. After the war, the works were returned 
to Germany subsequent to being exhibited in the United States. DESKBOOK, supra note 6, 
at 177-78. 
64. 1949 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 9. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. art. 147 (describing wanton and extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty to be a "grave breach" of the convention). 
67. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2. 
68. See supra note 2. 
69. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(3). 
70. Id. art. 18(1). 
71. Id. art. 3. 
72. Protocol I, supra note 9. 
73. Protocol II, supra note 9. 
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property.74 A basic premise of the protocols is that parties shall 
7 4. For a detailed description of the drafting of Protocol I, see H. LEVIE, PROTECTION 
OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS (4 vols. 1979), and M. BOTHE, 
K.J. PORTSCH & W.A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 519-21 (1982), wherein 
the authors state: 
2.23. The nature of the offense is a direct attack upon certain civilian objects- the 
highly privileged objects- with the result of their extensive destruction. As in para. 
3 (b) and (c) a certain consequence of the act is required. It is, however, added that 
the attack is justified if the objects have been apparently used in support of the 
military effort (see reference to Art. 53, subpara. (b)), or when such objects are 
located in the immediate proximity of military objectives. In this way the problem 
of collateral damage is covered. 
2.24. The subject of the offense does not appear in the provision. According to the 
nature of the offence it may be committed by any military leader, even of a small 
unit, who commands military personnel and has the yower to decide whether an 
attack shall be made. It could also be the High Command of the armed forces of 
a HCP. 
2.26. The objects of the offence are "clearly recognized historic monuments, works 
of art or places of worship" which fulfill certain requirements, i.e., (1) they "con-
stitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples"; and (2) "to which special pro-
tection has been given by special arrangement." As an example of such an arrange-
ment reference is made to measures "within the framework of a competent inter-
national organization" without, however, mentioning this organization by name nor 
the measures taken by it. Article 53 on the other hand openly refers to the Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict of 14 May 1954, and also to other instruments, in the process of providing 
that its provisions are enacted "without prejudice" to this or other Conventions. 
Even if it is admissible to regard the references to the unnamed international 
organization and its measures as allusions to UNESCO and the Hague Convention 
respectively, the legal significance of the reference remains doubtful. The defini-
tions of the protected objects in subpara. (d) and in Art. 1 of the UNESCO Con-
vention are not identical; and not all State Parties to the Conventions have also 
ratified the UNESCO Convention . 
. . . Under these circumstances it does not seem legitimate to use the UNESCO 
Convention as a point of reference in the same way as "the relevant provisions 
of this Protocol" -i.e. of Parts III and IV - have been used in other cases (e.g. para. 
3, opening words) to explain the requirement that these acts had to be committed 
"in violation of the Conventions and the Protocol." 
2.26. Subparagraph (e) is based on a proposal by Switzerland which was accepted 
without great difficulties. It repeats a provision of Arts. 50, 51, 130, 147 of the 
Conventions without adding any new element. It is already covered by para. 1 and 
is extended to new categories of. protected persons by para. 2. 
2.27. Paragraph 5: From the beginning of the general debate on Art. 85 in the first 
Committee there were suggestions that the principles applied by the war crimes 
tribunals of the period after World War II should be incorporated into the Pro-
tocol. The practical consequences to be drawn from this incorporation were more 
or less precisely explained .... The basis for the deliberations of the Subgroup 
was a proposal limited to the statement that "grave breaches ... shall be regard-
ed as war crimes," with a reference to Art. 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal added. This statement as worded, was certainly 
not incorrect, if taken directly. Most of the examples of war crimes listed in Art. 
6(2)(b) of the Charter are grave breaches under the Conventions (see 1.1). There 
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at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military targets, 
directing operations only against military objectives.75 Without pre-
judice to the other relevant international instruments, article 53 
of Protocol I prohibits acts of hostility against historic monuments, 
works of art, or places of worship which constitute the cultural or 
spiritual heritage of a people. The article further prohibits the use 
of such property for the military effort and prohibits direct reprisals 
against such property.76 The Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols make it a "grave breach" to destroy clearly recognized 
historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship.77 As a "grave 
breach," the offense constitutes a war crime, and thus an interna-
tional crime. The offense, therefore, becomes subject to universal 
as well as territorial jurisdiction, which in this case would be the 
aggrieved state where the violative act was committed, or against 
which it was committed. 
Thus, under the regulation of armed conflicts, a violation of 
internationally protected cultural property constitutes a war crime, 
and is subject to prosecution and punishment as in the case of all 
other international crimes.78 In this respect, even though the rele-
vant provisions of the applicable convention do not so state 
specifically, the theory of universal jurisdiction is applicable to such 
was, however, undeniably the danger that this formulation lent itself to the draw-
ing of the opposite conclusion, viz. that all acts classified as war crimes, namely 
all "violations of the laws and customs of war," would be regarded as grave breaches, 
and that in this way the method of strict definition of certain acts as grave breaches, 
adopted in the preceding paragraphs, would be nullified. This objection to a 
reference to the Nuremberg Charter led to a proposal to delete it and to add the 
introductory words: "Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and 
of the Protocol" in order to make it clear that the declaration that gave breaches 
are war crimes has neither the consequence that all war crimes are grave breaches 
nor the result that persons found guilty of having committed grave breaches lose 
the protection of humanitarian law .... 
2.28. The method employed in Art. 85 is selective. The only offences admitted are 
those which are strictly defined and have a solid basis in the Protocol. ... There 
are, however, no general rules which would generally prohibit reprisals in cases 
where a prosecution of grave breaches is possible, nor any which provide that all 
acts which are prohibited as reprisals are automatically also grave breaches. There 
may be a presumption that an act which is prohibited as reprisal should also be 
a grave breach (in view of its gravity), but it is not more than a presumption and 
it is up to the legislator whether he is willing to follow it or not. 
75. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 48. 
76. Id. See also Protocol II, supra note 9, art. 16. 
77. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 9, art. 47, and Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 
85(4)(d). 
78. See DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7. 
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violations, in addition to the territorial theory, but not to the 
exclusion of other theories that an aggrieved state may elect to 
apply. 
Since jurisdictional bases are not enunciated in the relevant 
conventions, there are, of course, no provisions applicable to a rank-
ing of jurisdictional theories nor are there any guidelines for the 
resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction. Therefore, state-parties to 
these conventions are left with whatever guidance customary in-
ternational law and private international law may offer in that 
respect. This leaves the potential for jurisdictional conflict without 
effective sources of resolution in the relevant conventional inter-
national law. Thus, violations of these conventions are subject to 
the judicial jurisdiction of a potential international criminal court, 
should one be established, and to the jurisdiction of national military 
tribunals, whether of a general, ordinary, or ad hoc nature. 
These violations, as international crimes, will entail the duties 
of states to prosecute or extradite and to provide judicial assistance 
and cooperation.79 These conventions, and the duties that they 
create, and their consequences, will be contextually limited. They 
will also be limited in their application to those persons who come 
within the meaning of the relevant conventions and, eventually, to 
national codes or laws of military justice. As a result, a convention 
might exclude certain categories of offenses and certain categories 
of persons from the judicial jurisdictional competence of the 
tribunals, and all of the consequences attaching to the prosecution 
and punishment of international crimes. 
B. PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING TIMES OF PEACE 
International agreements protecting cultural property during 
times of peace are a product of this century.80 The first interna-
tional multilateral convention on this subject was concluded in 1954, 
and is applicable essentially to armed conflicts, as discussed above, 
although not exclusively limited to the context of war.81 The 1954 
Hague Convention applies to international traffic of unlawfully 
seized cultural property during armed conflicts and after the ter-
mination of the conflict. Thus, by extension, the convention also ap-
plies to peacetime conduct which derives from conduct or events 
whose origin was during wartime. 
79. See supra note 15. 
80. See supra note 2. 
81. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2. 
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The regional inter-American multilateral Roerich Pact,82 signed 
in 1935, was the earliest document to protect cultural property in 
time of peace, although it also extends into periods of armed 
conflict.83 The important difference between these two instruments 
and those applicable to other periods as discussed in this section 
is the absence of contextual overlap and application. The wartime 
related conventions apply to destruction, pillage and plunder by 
armed forces, and policies and practices of occupying forces, w bile 
the peacetime conventions apply to private conduct. Thus, the ob-
ject of the protection is clearly distinguishable, as are the persons 
intended to be deterred and eventually prosecuted and punished, 
the practices sought to be prevented, controlled and suppressed, 
the means to accomplish these objectives, and the remedies 
available. Because of these distinctions, the enforcement scheme 
reflected in the conventions analyzed below is also different. Occa-
sionally, the contextual overlap in some conventions blurs the 
distinctions as is discussed in the ensuing section. 
The disproportionate number of international instruments pro-
tecting cultural property in time of war, in relation to the number 
of conventions protecting cultural property in time of peace, is 
perhaps due to the perception that the danger of destruction and 
pillage that may befall cultural property is greater in wartime than 
in peacetime. It should be noted that the need to protect cultural 
property from theft and illicit transfer of ownership in peacetime 
is just as potentially significant, both quantitatively and qualitative-
ly. Further, conventions relating to a wartime context are 
predicated on the unarticulated premise that the violative conduct 
is state-sponsored, while those conventions relating to a peacetime 
context are predicated on the premise that the violative conduct 
is not state-sponsored, but rather is sponsored essentially by in-
dividuals for their personal or pecuniary interest.84 
82. Roerich Pact, supra note 2, art. 5. 
83. It is interesting to note that, over the years, the conventions protecting cultural 
property or treaties containing provisions protecting cultural property have progressively 
expanded their applicability beyond situations of international armed conflict to periods of 
civil conflict and belligerent occupation. In light of this progression perhaps the recent ap-
plication of principles of international law to conduct occurring outside the context of 
hostilities is a logical progression of the relevant international legislation making protec-
tion of cultural property during peacetime the final stage of this historicai development. 
84. For the distinction between individual and state-sponsored activity within the mean-
ing of international criminal law, see e.g., DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 
7, at 40-44. 
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In the first instance, the consequence is that the conduct may 
also inure to the benefit of the state who commits the violation 
(even though committed by individuals). In the second instance, the 
primary beneficiary of the violation is the private interest of those 
who, in their private or personal capacity, commit such acts for their 
pecuniary or personal interests. These presumed distinctions are 
nowhere apparent in the relevant texts. Consequently, no jurisdic-
tional distinctions are made in these texts as to the typology of viola-
tions, the applicable sanctions and, in general, their enforcement 
aspects. Such enforcement should be tailored to the dual purpose 
of protecting a defined interest from certain types of violative con-
duct and with due regard to the effectiveness of deterrence, preven-
tion, control, and suppression. 
The multilateral treaty of primary significance to the protec-
tion of cultural property in peacetime is the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.85 
The convention treats the term "cultural property" as inclusive of 
a wide variety of property, and import, export, and transfer of 
ownership of cultural property contrary to the provisions is deemed 
illicit.86 The parties undertake to prevent transfer of ownership and 
illicit movement of such property, to ensure the earliest possible 
restitution of property to the rightful owner, to admit actions for 
recovery of cultural property brought by or on behalf of rightful 
owners, and to recognize the indefeasible right of each state to 
declare certain cultural property as inalienable and, therefore, ipso 
facto, not to be privately exported.87 
The UNESCO Convention is supplemented by the 1972 Con-
vention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage.88 International protection of the world cultural and natural 
heritage requires the establishment of national protective means, 
and a system of international cooperation and assistance designed 
85. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1. The convention is the result of a 1962 UNESCO 
Resolution (UNESCO Records of the General Conference, 12th Session, at 51-52 (1962)) on 
the desirability of an international convention for the protection of cultural property. For 
an extensive discussion of the convent ion, see Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the 
Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J . 537 (1971). 
86. UNESCO Convention, supra note l , art. 3. In addition, t he export or transfe r of 
ownership under direct compulsion from an occupied tei-ritory by a foreign power is illicit. 
Id. art. 11. 
87. Id. art. 3. 
88. World Heritage Convention, supra note 2. 
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to support the signatory parties in their efforts to, inter alia, iden-
tify and conserve that heritage.89 States are to establish national 
services to protect, conserve, and exhibit cultural property,90 and 
to take appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative, and 
financial measures for the identification, protection, conservation, 
and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage.91 These means are the 
essential basis for the effective control, prevention, and suppres-
sion of violative conduct. 
Three regional agreements are also designed to accomplish 
these purposes. Two are European and one is inter-American. The 
European Cultural Convention of 195492 encourages a policy of com-
mon action among the signatory states to safeguard and encourage 
the development of European culture.93 The European Convention 
on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage of 1969,9' prohibits 
illicit excavations95 and promotes delimination and protection of 
archaeological areas. 96 
A third European Convention is in Draft, "European Convention 
on Offences Relating to Cultural Property ,"96Awhich establishes in 
Article 13 the following: 
1. Each Party shall take the necessary measures in order to 
establish its competence to prosecute any offence relating to 
cultural property: 
a. committed on its territory, including its internal and ter-
ritorial waters, or in its airspace; 
b. committed on board a ship or an aircraft registered in it; 
c. committed outside its territory by one of its nationals; 
d. committed outside its territory by a person having 
his/her habitual residence on its territory; 
e. committed outside its territory when the cultural prop-
erty against which that offence was directed belongs to 
the said Party or one of its nationals; 
89. Id. art. 7. 
90. Id. art 5(b). 
91. Id. art. 5(d). 
92. European Cultural Convention, supra note 2. 
93. Id. art. 2. 
94. European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2. 
95. Id. art. 7. 
96. Id. art 2. 
96A. See Council of Europe Doc. CDPC (84)8, Add. II, April 26, 1984, and the earlier 
report of The Select Committee of Experts on International Co-operation in the Field of 
Offences Relating to Works of Art D.oc. CDPC (84)3, January 30, 1984. 
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f. committed outside its territory when it was directed 
against cultural property originally found within its 
territory. 
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph l, sub-paragraphs (d) and 
(f), a Party shall not be competent to institute proceedings in 
respect of an offence relating to cultural property committed 
outside its territory unless the suspected person is on its 
territory. 
301 
It is clearly the most specific jurisdictional clause in any interna-
tional instrument. 
The Organization of American States has adopted a Conven-
tion on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic 
Heritage of the American Nations.97 The export of cultural prop-
erty as defined by article 2 of the convention is considered unlawful, 
except where authorized.98 The convention discourages illegal export 
or import of cultural property between the American states and 
promotes cooperation and mutual appreciation with regard to 
cultural property.99 
Two bilateral treaties are also relevant in this context. They 
are between the United States and Mexico, and the United States 
and Peru. In response to Mexican concern over the illegal export 
of Mayan artifacts, the United States and Mexico entered into a 
Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery and Return of 
Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties.100 It was 
agreed that the states would deter illicit excavation and theft 
of cultural property, 101 and employ the legal means at their disposal 
to recover and return objects stolen following the effective date 
of the treaty.102 The combination of the United States National 
Stolen Property Act103 and a 1972 Mexican law giving title to all 
pre-Hispanic artifacts to the Mexican state, subject to rights ac-
quired before enactment of the law,104 has resulted in two landmark 
97. OAS Convention, supra note 2. 
98. Id. art. 3. 
99. Id. art 1. 
100. Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Proper· 
ties, July 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 (effective Mar. 24, 1973) [hereinafter cited 
as United States·Mexico Treaty]. 
101. Id. art Il(l)(b). 
102. Id. art. 111(1). The Attorney General of the United States is, therefore, authorized 
to institute civil actions in appropriate district courts to recover property illegally exported 
from Mexico. Id. at 111(3). 
103. 18 u.s.c. § 2315 (1976). 
104. Ley Federal Sohre Monumentos y Zontas Arqueologicos, Artisticos y Historicos, 
312 D.O. 16, 16 May 1972. 
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court decisions. These decisions held that an object may be con-
sidered as stolen under the National Stolen Property Act subse-
quent to a declaration of ownership by a foreign country.105 
In 1981, the United States and Peru signed an Agreement for 
Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historic, and 
Cultural Property,106 similar to the 1970 Mexican-American treaty. 
The Peruvian agreement, however, focuses on communication con-
cerning stolen property likely to be introduced into international 
trade.107 The parties agree to detect and locate such objects enter-
ing their territory and to employ all legal means to recover and 
return stolen cultural property to the requesting party .108 
Lastly, a number of international conventions, not on the pro-
tection of cultural property but on the law of the sea, contain pro-
visions which affect marine archaeology.109 In fact, due to the essen-
tially jurisdictional nature of the conventions on the law of the sea, 
these documents are the only international agreements to provide 
explicit statements of jurisdiction which can be applied to cultural 
property, albeit within a narrow context. The Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, opened for signature in 1982,110 contains two ar-
105. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. McClain, 
545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as McClain I]; United States v. McClain, 593 
F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as McClain II]. For a further discussion of McClain 
I, see Note, Criminal Law: Theft of Artifacts-Once a National Declares Ownership of an Ar-
tifact, an IUegally Ex-port;ed Artifact Can Be Considered Stolen Under the National Stolen Prop-
erty Act, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 793 (1977). 
In order to give Mexico's law international effect, the United States has adopted an Act 
to Prevent Importation of Pre-Columbian Sculpture and Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1976), 
which prohibits the import into the United States from anywhere in the world of pre-
Columbian monumental architecture, sculpture or murals, without a certificate stating that 
the export was not in violation of the laws of the country of origin of the property. 
106. Agreement for Recovery and Return of Stolen Property, September 15, 1981, 80 
Stat. 271; T.l.A.S. No. 10136 (effective Sept. 15, 1981) [hereinafter cited as United States-
Peru Treaty]. 
107. Id. at 11(1). 
108. Id. art.11(2). For further discussion of the treaty, see Note, Emerging U.S. Policy 
with Regard to the International Movement of National Cultural Property, 7 INT'L L.J. 166 
(1982). 
109. While the conventions do not specifically deal with marine archaeology, they 
establish a division of maritime jurisdiction. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effec-
tive Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 
T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964); Convention on the High Seas, 
done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.l.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 
1962); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 
done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966). 
110. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3. 
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ticles dealing with cultural property found beyond a nation's shores. 
Article 149 states that all archaeological or historic objects found 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be preserved or 
disposed of for the benefit of mankind, with particular regard being 
paid to the preferential rights of the state of origin, state of cultural 
origin, or state of historical and archaeological origin of the prop-
erty. Cultural property found in the contiguous zone is provided 
limited protection under article 303 of the convention.111 
The various conventions discussed hereinabove establish ex-
plicitly or implicitly two theories of jurisdiction: the territoriality 
theory, which is common to all the conventions, and what, for lack 
of a specific theory, could fall under an extension of the passive 
personality theory whereby the county of origin maintains a con-
tinuous right over the property irrespective of its subsequent illicit 
transfer or change of actual possessory control (much as the theory 
proper extends to the protection of the nationals of a given state).112 
All of these conventions, though recognizing the right of state 
ownership and state regulation of various aspects of excavation, 
and the import, export and trade of cultural property as defined in 
each relevant instrument, apply essentially a territorial jurisdic-
tional theory with respect to law making and law enforcement. But, 
they do extend certainly and explicitly to an in rem or quasi in rem 
right of the state of origin as pertains to the objects in question 
beyond territorial confines. In that respect, however, it is a form 
of the dual extension of the territorial theory through the subjec-
tive and objective territorial application which effectively extends 
it extra-territorially.113 The conventions can also be said to embody 
the theory of the protected interest, 114 which in this context overlaps 
with the extensions of the territoriality theory. These theories will 
be briefly discusse.d below. 
111. Id. 
112. For an excellent overview of the views of jurisdiction, see Blakesley, United States 
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982) [hereinafter 
referred to as Blakesley]. For the application of the passive personality doctrine, see At-
torney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 1.L.R. 5 (Israel Dist. Ct. Jerus. 1961). See also P. 
PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964); for the only decision by the International Court of 
Justice on that subject, see The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.l.J., ser. A., No. 10, at 
74 (Moore, J., dissenting); II M. Hudson, World Court Reports 71 (1935). 
113. See Blakesley, supra note 112, 1114-32. See also George, Jurisdictional Basis for 
Criminal Legislation and Its Enforcement, 1983 MICH. Y.B. INT'L. LEGAL STUD. 3-42. 
114. See Blakesley, supra note 112, at 1132-39. See also Marcuss & Richard, Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COL UM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Marcuss & Richard]. 
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The above-mentioned instruments presuppose that all states 
share the same values and interests in protecting cultural property 
from the cupidity of individuals acting in their private or personal 
capacity to the detriment of the concerned states and other pro-
tected parties. That premise leads to another assumption, namely 
that states will cooperate in the prevention and suppression of such 
violations. Because states under these conventions are presumed 
not to sponsor such practices (which are also presumed to be con-
trary to their national laws) the legal nature of the violation is that 
of a common crime with transnational effect. However, a different 
characterization can also be made. Because such conduct potentially 
affects all states, is mostly committed transnationally, and violates 
existing international prescriptions, it should be deemed an inter-
national crime irrespective of whether committed in time of peace 
or war .115 Furthermore, since it is also an international crime when 
committed in time of war, the violation should not be considered 
any differently in time of peace when states are even more desirous 
and capable of international cooperation in preventing and suppress-
ing such violative conduct. 
In the Draft International Criminal Code prepared by this 
writer, theft of national and archaeological treasures is deemed an 
international crime because of the reasons stated above.116 The draft 
code's section dealing with enforcement, article IV, sets out theories 
of jurisdiction applicable to all crimes contained in the code and 
establishes a ranking of these theories as a rule for resolution of 
jurisdictional conflicts.117 
The conventions discussed above, which apply to the context 
of peace, cover categories of offenses and offenders which differ 
from those covered by conventions on the regulation of armed con-
flicts discussed in the earlier section. They differ not only as to con-
textual application, but also as to typology of violations, their 
characterization (as an international crime, a transnational crime, 
or a national common crime), the category of offenders to which 
a violation applies, and the competent jurisdictional forum (i.e., na-
tional tribunals of ordinary criminal or civil jurisdiction, as opposed 
to an international criminal court or national military tribunals). 
As yet no convention exists which bridges the different contexts, 
applies comprehensively to all types of offenses and offenders, and 
115. See, e.g., DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7. 
116. DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7, at 98. See also Appendix infra. 
117. Id. §§ 1, 2, at 145. 
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establishes measures common, or distinct, for these offenses and 
offenders. The lack of a comprehensive scheme of enforcement is 
thus reflected in the absence of effective jurisdictional bases that 
may extend beyond the territoriality theory common to all rele-
vant international instruments. 
III. THEORIES OF JURISDICTION RECOGNIZED 
AND APPLIED IN CONVENTIONAL AND CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Five theories of jurisdiction are recognized under international 
law as giving rise to the power to legislate and the power to en-
force. They are, in order of their general international recognition:118 
(1) the territorial theory, based on the notion of sovereignty that 
a state may assert jurisdiction over any conduct committed within 
its territory, extended by the subjective and objective· theories of 
territoriality, and the law of the flag, or floating territoriality; (2) 
the protective or protected interest theory, based on the concept 
that a state should be allowed to assert jurisdiction over conduct 
occurring outside the state's territory which threatens the signifi-
cant interests of the state; (3) the active personality theory, based 
on the notion that concomitant to a citizen's right to be protected 
by the state, the citizen has certain duties to his country even ex-
traterritorially; (4) the passive personality theory, based on the 
theory that a st.ate has a legitimate interest in the protection of 
its nationals abroad; and (5) the universality theory, based on the 
theory that crimes delicti }us gentium should be subject to the 
jurisdiction of all states, irrespective of where the acts have been 
committed, to allow for the protection of the universal values and 
interests of humankind. 
A. TERRITORIAL THEORY AND ITS EXTENSIONS 
The territorial theory is the basis upon which all states 
prescribe and enforce rules of conduct within their territory. As 
indicated previously, the term "jurisdiction" refers to the rule-
making and rule-enforcing powers of a state. Moreover, as stated 
earlier, the operative question is whether these two aspects of 
jurisdiction must co-exist within the territorial boundaries of the 
state asserting jurisdiction. Under general principles of international 
law and private international law, there is no such requirement. 
Indeed, a state may exercise its jurisdiction in one of its many forms 
118. See supra notes 4, 112, 113. 
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(in personam, in rem, quasi in rem) without necessarily applying 
its own laws, either because its laws will require or permit the ap-
plication of another state's law, or because it is the only judicially 
competent forum which will apply another state's law.119 Thus, a 
state having jurisdiction over the alleged offender or the property 
in question (the rule-enforcing state) may apply the law of a foreign 
state which has been violated by the conduct of the offender (rule-
making state). A number of cases involving protection of cultural 
property have made use of foreign law as a basis for judicial action.120 
Considering the diverse national legislation concerning protection 
of cultural property, application of the law of the aggrieved state, 
through the conflict of laws rules of the adjudicating state, may 
resolve the conflicts of law problem.121 
Under existing international instruments and the laws of most 
states, the courts of the state where the property is located at the 
time of the claim will have the first opportunity to exercise civil 
and criminal jurisdiction. This is true irrespective of whether the 
civil basis of jurisdiction is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem, 
and whether the criminal prosecution is in personam or in absen-
tia. Among the many jurisdictional problems is one related to the 
concomitance of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and the concurrent 
presence within the jurisdiction of both the defendant and the prop-
erty. Thus, if the property is stolen from State A, stored in State 
B, the violator is a citizen of State C, and is found in State D, there 
are multiple competent jurisdictions. There is no basis for deter-
mining which has priority, or which jurisdiction is entitled to judicial 
assistance prior to or during the trial, or which one is entitled to 
the enforcement of its judgment. 
None of the existing conventions deal with these questions, nor 
do they provide a sufficient basis from which to extrapolate some 
guidance for the resolution of such conflict of laws problems. Thus, 
the national law of each affected state will control. The result is 
diversity, inconsistency and unpredictability of outcome as to such 
conflicts of judicial jurisdiction and conflicts of applicable substan-
tive laws. These problems cannot begin to find a modicum of har-
monization under the present state of the applicable substantive 
law of international protection of cultural property. Consequently, 
the need for further international legislation is required. 
119. See supra note 5. 
120. See supra note 105. 
121. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 119. 
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B. PROTECTIVE OR PROTECTED INTEREST THEORY 
Although the protective or protected interest theory implies 
conduct committed abroad which when causing an internal impact 
affects intangible rights specifically located within the territory, 
it is a particularly appropriate theory to apply to the protection 
of cultural property .122 In accordance with the theory, the state from 
which the cultural property has been illegally removed would have 
jurisdiction over other interested states or would be able to exer-
cise jurisdiction over an offender. But, the priority of such a theory 
over another is not established, save for the general proposition 
that the territoriality theory is deemed in general to have the higher 
priority. Perhaps this is because of the simple practical logic that 
the state where the offender, the offense, or the object of the of-
fense is found cannot be effectively stripped of its right of legal 
action. It must also be stated that an extension of the territoriality 
theory under the subjective-objective theory will usually encom-
pass the protected interest theory. This extension of the protected 
interest theory is akin to a long-arm extension of jurisdiction by 
the state claiming a right or interest in the property in question 
to protect such rights or interests in the property in question. The 
above result provides a valid and effective basis for assertion of 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the theory should be embodied in the various 
international conventions protecting cultural property. 
C. ACTIVE PERSONALITY THEORY 
Jurisdiction over violations of international agreements pro-
tecting cultural property may be asserted through the active per-
sonality theory, thereby allowing a state to assert jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by nationals outside the state's territory. In order 
to determine whether this theory is available to a state, two ap-
proaches may be taken. The first is to review the general laws of 
the state and ascertain whether they incorporate the active per-
sonality theory. The second is to review any specific laws dealing 
with protection of cultural property with the same view. 
In terms of general laws, a number of countries provide for 
the doctrine of active personality .123 In such case, a citizen of a coun-
122. RESTATEMENT, supa note 4, § 33; Harvard Draft Code, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8. 
123. See Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980) and Matter of Assarsson, 
687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982) where Sweden requested the extradition of the relator from 
the United States for a crime committed in Denmark on the basis of its criminal law provi-
sions that make a Swedish citizen subject to prosecution in Sweden for a crime committed 
in another state. See also EXTRADITION, supra note 4. 
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try who commits a crime anywhere in the world, irrespective of 
whether the conduct constitutes a crime in the legal system of the 
country of origin, is subject to the penal jurisdiction of his country 
of citizenship. Consequently, where conduct constitutes a crime in 
the territory in which it occurred, any violation would subject an 
actor to the jurisdiction of his national state, in addition to the 
jurisdiction of the state in which the conduct took place.124 
D. PASSIVE PERSONALITY THEORY 
The passive personality theory is not per se applicable to the 
protection of cultural property. However, if the notion of protec-
tion can extend from persons to property and if an intangible right 
in that cultural property is a national right (as well as a private 
proprietary interest), then it could be said to apply .125 
E. UNIVERSALITY THEORY 
The historical development of the law of armed conflict makes 
it clear that damage and confiscation of cultural property is a war 
crime. Such conduct was prosecuted under the universality theory 
at the Nuremberg trials.126 However, there is some difficulty, under 
certain international instruments, in applying the universality 
theory beyond situations of armed conflict to encompass conduct 
outside the context of an international crime. If one regards pillage 
in any form, conducted at any time, to be an international crime, 
then the principle of universality would apply.127 Although a number 
of countries have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction on this basis 
for whatever crime, it may be contended that as soon as an inter-
national crime is established, universality of jurisdiction obtains as 
a rule of customary international law.128 Recognition for this prop-
Italy has a similar theory of jurisdiction, in particular where an Italian national is ac-
cused of a crime in another state. Where extradition is requested but denied, atr Italy does 
not allow extradition of its nationals, the Italian judicial authorities, at the request of the 
Procuratore Generale and with the concurrence of the Minister of Justice, will approve pros-
ecution of the offender in the Italian criminal courts, thus applying the active personality 
theory. ITALIAN PENAL CODE (CODICE PENALE), art. 9 (E.H. Wise trans.1978). This question was 
dealt with in part at the Xlth International Congress of Comparative Law, Caracas, 
Venezuela, 1982, and covered by this writer as a reporter on question V, see Bassiouni, 
GENERAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL STATUS OF THE REQUESTED STATE DENYING EXTRADITION, 
PROCEEDINGS OF XITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (in print). 
124. See id. 
125. See supra note 112. 
126. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 56, at 107-11; Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal: Far East, January 19 and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S . No. 1589, and note 57. 
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osition can be found in both the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes 
trials.129 In addition, the universality theory has been deemed to 
be an appropriate jurisdictional theory with respect to the Genocide 
Convention,130 to piracy,131 and to hijacking under the 1970 Hague 
Convention132 and the 1971 Montreal Convention.133 
An examination of these and other international criminal law 
conventions leads to the conclusion that a doctrine of universality 
of jurisdiction over international crimes exists under conventional 
and customary international law.134 Thus, if violations of conven-
tions protecting cultural property can be considered to be interna-
tional crimes, universality would apply.135 
IV. UNITED STATES' APPROACHES 
The United States has boldly extended extraterritorial applica-
tion of criminal jurisdiction in recent years, 136 though in terms of 
potential conflicts of laws, this may not be a positive development. 
The trend toward extraterritoriality in the United States began 
with the American Banana137 and Alcoa138 cases, and other cases in 
the antitrust area. The jurisdictional theories applied in these cases 
were reflected and expanded in subsequent legislation, including 
129. See infra note 134. 
130. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, done Dec. 
9, 1948, 73 U.N.T.S. 277. For a discussion of the crime of genocide, see Bassiouni, Genocide 
and Racial Discrimination, in I M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 523 (1973); Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 145 (1947). 
131. G.O.W. MUELLER & E.M. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1965). See also 
Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, in I M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 455 (1973). 
132. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970, 
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.l.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (effective Oct. 14, 1971). 
133. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, done Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (effective Jan. 26, 1973). 
134. Harvard Draft Code, supra note 4, art. 97. The Harvard convention suggests that 
universality would be applicable to such international crimes as slavery, traffic in persons 
and drugs, and war crimes. See also Feller, Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Ele-
ment, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 
(1973). See DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7, for the 20 other international 
crimes. 
135. The conventions in question, of course, skirt this issue altogether, and no case has 
taken this particular position. 
136. EXTRADITION, supra note 4, ch. VI,§ 7, p. 1, and supra note 111and112. 
137. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See also Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-290, title IV, § 401, 96 Stat. 1246 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 6a) and amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). 
138. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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the Trading with the Enemy Act, 139 the Export Administration 
Act,140 the anti-boycott legislation,141 the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 142 the Securities and Exchange Act, 143 and the Internal Revenue 
Code.144 There are presently eighteen different criminal provisions 
of the United States Code that apply extraterritorially.145 These and 
other special legislative enactments broaden the scope of United 
States' extraterritorial jurisdiction without asserting any specific 
theory therefor. 
Although the Federal Criminal Code currently does not con-
tain an expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction provision, extensions 
of criminal jurisdiction, as reflected in the proposed revisions to 
the Code contain the broadest possible bases ever considered or 
applied (but follow prior extensions of specific legislation).146 No 
139. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) amended 
by Pub. L. No. 97-164, Title I,§§ 160(a)(17), 161(9), 96 Stat. 48, 49 (codified at 50 App. U.S.C.A. 
§§ 10, 42 (1982)). 
140. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. 
V 1981) amended by Export Administration Act of 1981, Pub. L . 97-145, 95 Stat. 1727 (codified 
at 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 2401note,2405, 2410, 2411, 2417 (Supp. V. 1981)). See Note, Trade-The 
Export Administration Act of 1979, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 361 (1980). See also Marcuss 
& Richard, supra note 114. 
141. 50 App. U.S.C. § 2407 (Supp. II 1979). See also Marcus & Richard, supra note 114. 
142. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, Title I, § 101, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified at 15 U.S.C §§ 78a note, 78dd-l, 78dd-2 and amending §§ 78m and 78ff (1982)). See 
Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Problems of Extraterritorial Application, 12 V AND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1979). 
143. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 Title I, Pub. L. 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 78a-78hh (1982)). See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Federal 
Securities Code: An Examination of the Role of International Law in American Courts, 11 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1978); Note, Securities-Transnational Application of Anti-Fraud 
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws Expanded-SEC v. Kasser, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 
795 (1977). 
144. 26 l.R.C. §§ 1-9041 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). 
145. See Blakesley, supra note 112. 
146. The Criminal Code Reform Acts of 1977 amending 18 U.S.C., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(May 1977). See also the second version of the proposed Federal Criminal Code presented 
in S.B. 1437, §§ 202, 1734, 1751. See Note, E xtraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Proposed 
Federal Criminal Codes: Senate Bill 1630 and House Bill 1647, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305 
(1982). 
These extensions have been proposed without any regard whatsoever to the conflict 
of laws questions that may be created, and certainly without due regard for the foreign policy 
and diplomatic consequen~es of creating such a maze of regulations. Recall that the result 
of President Reagan's embargo of December 1981 on trading with the U.S.S.R. It involved 
the attempted extraterritorial application of U.S. law to prevent export to the U.S.S.R. of 
products manufactured in Great Britain and France predicated on licenses of technology 
originally developed in the United States. The decision created a serious conflict between 
the United States and those two countries. 
The proposed changes to the Federal Criminal Code go far beyond the provisions of 
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extraterritorial provisions exist, however, with respect to enforce-
ment of provisions protecting cultural property, but nothing would 
prevent the adoption of such legislation which could be predicated 
on the active personality theory. The United States would, 
therefore, be able to prosecute an American citizen who has com-
mitted a violation of a convention to which the United States is 
a party, even if that violation occurred outside United States 
territory .147 
V. APPRAISAL OF CONVENTIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES IN THE PROTECTION OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY 
Jurisdiction is the cornerstone of enforcement, therefore 
jurisdiction and enforcement are interlocked. The choice of a 
jurisdictional theory is a reflection of the intended enforcement 
scheme, and, mutatis mutandi, the determination of the scope of 
enforcement will entail the choice of a given jurisdictional theory. 
The wider the jurisdictional scope, the broader and, presumably, 
the more effective is enforcement. This is why the scope of the en-
forcement scheme of a relevant convention is an intricate part of 
its jurisdictional basis. 
The relevant group of conventions analyzed herein is comprised 
of the 1954 Hague Convention protecting cultural property during 
armed conflict,148 the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 149 the World 
Heritage Convention,150 the Convention on the Law of the Sea,151 
the regional European conventions, 152 the OAS Convention, 153 and 
the RESTATEMENT, supra note 4. See also Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of 
U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.1 (1979); 
Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981). 
147. With respect to internationally protected persons such as diplomats, foreign govern-
ment officials, heads of state, etc., see 18 U.S.C. § 1116(bX6) (1976) which provides for U.S. 
jurisdiction irrespective of where the crime was committed; Congress has extended federal 
jurisdiction for crimes against certain high-ranking officials beyond United States jurisdic-
tion. 95 Stat. 1219, Pub. L. 97-285 (S.907), 18 U.S.C. § 351 and § 1751(g) (1976). 
148. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2. 
149. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1. 
150. See supra note 2. 
151. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3. 
152. European Cultural Convention, supra note 2; European Archaeological Conven-
tion, supra note 2. 
153. OAS Convention, supra note 2. 
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the United States-Mexico154 and United States-Peru treaties.155 The 
common purpose of these instruments is to protect a specifically 
identifiable kind of property right. However, the conventions have 
not been drafted to provide protection irrespective of any and all 
particular circumstances. Why, it may be asked, has no single con-
vention dealing with all aspects of the protection of cultural prop-
erty been drafted? The answer is simply a lack of political will on 
the part of the world community to do so, especially in light of con-
flicting values, interests, and strategies of the diverse participants 
in the world community. 
The instruments, however, appear to share the same basic 
values expressed in the general goals of protecting national cultural 
property and national heritage as a basic cultural human right.156 
But, a divergence appears in the definition of what constitutes 
cultural property,157 and that divergence has an impact on the 
strategies of protective schemes contemplated by the international 
instruments protecting cultural property. Thus, enforcement models 
differ and jurisdictional approaches are not clearly established 
beyond the most obvious, which in this instance is the territorial-
ity principle. 
One has to ask why the universality principle has not been 
recognized as applicable to these violations as when they occur in 
time of war and are considered war crimes, and for that matter 
to other international crimes as discussed above. The answer is 
simply that the international legislator has not yet unequivocally 
recognized violations of those international agreements protecting 
cultural property to be international crimes beyond the context of 
war crimes. One of the problems is the unfortunate distinction still 
preserved in international law between the law of war and the law 
of peace. Such a distinction should clearly be discarded in the area 
of international protection of cultural property, as it has largely 
disappeared in the area of international protection of human 
rights.158 Another reason is that government officials who negotiate 
154. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 100. 
155. United States-Peru Treaty, supra note 106. 
156. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, preamble; UNESCO Convention, supra 
note l, preamble; World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, preamble; European Cultural 
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; and e.g., supra note 28. 
157. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1; UNESCO Convention, supra note 
1, art. 1; World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, arts. l, 2; European Archaeological Con-
vention, supra note 2, art. 1; OAS Convention, supra note 2, art. 2. 
158. See supra note 17. 
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international agreements are traditionally cautious and conser-
vative, expecting to do only what is most widely and generally 
accepted, seldom treading new ground. As a result, they leave to 
other sources of international law what is really the more ap-
propriate task of conventional international law. Thus, the task fre-
quently befalls the "publicist" to advance the frontiers of interna-
tional law .159 
The conventions are generally consistent in their limited and 
narrow approach to the question of jurisdiction.160 Although they 
may implicitly establish a duty to punish or criminalize161 and, at 
times, a duty to cooperate in investigating, prosecuting, and 
punishing those who commit offenses against cultural property,162 
the conventions fail to explicitly make such statements. In compar-
ing the agreements dealing with the protection of cultural prop-
erty with other international criminal law conventions, one notes 
the absence of specific and broader provisions on jurisdiction, 
extradition, 163 and judicial assistance and cooperation in penal 
matters.164 
As stated above, the jurisdictional basis in all of the conven-
tions is the more limited territorial basis, and that theory is only 
implicitly established.165 The conventions contain such indirect 
159. See Statute of the ICJ, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153. 
160. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3, 28; UNESCO Convention, supra 
note 1, arts. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13; World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4, 5, 6, 7; Euro-
pean Cultural Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; European Archaeological Convention, supra 
note 2, art. 7. 
161. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 28; UNESCO Convention, supra note 
l, art. 8. 
162. UNESCO Convention, supra note l, art. 13(c); OAS Convention, supra note 2, arts. 
22, 14; United States Mexico Treaty, supra note 100, art. III. 
163. The one exception is the OAS Convention, supra note 2, which in article 14 sub-
jects those responsible for crimes against cultural property to appropriate extradition 
treaties. Article 11 imposes a duty to institute judicial action where required by the laws 
of a state petitioned for recovery of illegally acquired cultural property. See also DRAFT IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7. 
164. For judicial assistance and cooperation, see Gutzner, International Judicial 
Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 189 (1973); Markees, TheDifferenceinConceptBe-
tween Civil and Comrrwn Law Countries as to Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters, in II. M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P . NANDA, supra, at 171; 45 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT 
PENAL (1975). See also European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, done 
Apr. 20, 1952, 472 U.N.T.S. 185, Europ.T.S. 30, and European Convention on Transfer of 
Proceedings in Criminal Matters, done May 15, 1972, Europ.T.S. 73. 
165. Kegel & Seidel-Hohenveldern (trans. by Darby), On the Territoriality Principle in 
Public International Law, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 249 (1982). 
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statements as "in the most appropriate manner [for each state],"166 
"as appropriate for each country ,"167 "shall be governed by domestic 
legislation,"168 or "situated within their own territory."169 Perhaps 
because the territoriality theory is so accepted, the drafters felt 
that there was no need to specifically state it. The Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, also based on the territorial principle, remains 
the only one to provide explicit jurisdictional provisions, while also 
giving recognition to the jurisdictional claims of the country of 
origin, cultural origin, or historical and archaeological origin of the 
property .170 
The 1954 Hague Convention states merely that parties will 
prepare in time of peace, to safeguard cultural property situated 
within their own territory by taking such measures as they con-
sider appropriate.171 Further, the parties will take necessary steps, 
within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, to pros-
ecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon persons, 
regardless of nationality.112 The former provision asserts the applica-
tion of national law as the means through which cultural property 
is to be protected. The latter provision would appear to allow asser-
tion of jurisdiction on the basis of the subjective-objective territorial 
theory of jurisdiction, in that it does not limit jurisdiction to con-
duct occurring within the state's territory.173 Therefore, it may be 
said that a country may assert jurisdiction over the sale of stolen 
cultural property outside its territory where neither party to the 
sale is a national of the state asserting jurisdiction.174 
166. European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2, art. 7. 
167. World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; UNESCO Convention, supra note 
l, art. 5. 
168. OAS Convention, supra note 2, art. 7. 
169. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3. 
170. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3, art. 149. This article may create 
a conflict of law in that frequently more than one state will have one of the interests men-
tioned in the provision. The article provides no guidelines on resolution of such a conflict. 
171. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3. 
172. Id. art. 28. 
173. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 18. 
174. Id. Note that§ 18(b) of the RESTATEMENT requires the effect within the territory 
to be substantial. The question remains whether such a sale would constitute an effect 
substantial enough to confer jurisdiction. However, the case of the Afo-A-Kom of Cameroon 
suggests that transactions in cultural property may often be sufficiently substantial. The 
Afo-A-Kom is a wood carving said to represent the soul of the people of Cameroon. The 
disappearance of the statue in 1966 meant that an integral part of an intrinsically superstitious 
people's spiritual life was gone. When the piece appeared in a New York art gallery, a for-
mal request from the Cameroon government, supplemented by adverse public opinion, 
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However, use of the subjective-objective theory of territorial 
jurisdiction immediately creates a conflict of jurisdictions problem. 
The state wherein the effect of the proscribed conduct occurred 
would have objective territorial jurisdiction. The state in which the 
actual conduct took place would have subjective territorial jurisdic-
tion. Both states might have an equal interest in prosecuting the 
case, but the 1954 Hague Convention provides no basis on which 
to determine which state might have priority of jurisdiction or how 
to balance the interests of the states in order to confer jurisdic-
tion. It should be noted that the jurisdictional provisions in the 1954 
Hague Convention leave the prosecution and punishment of of-
fenders to be provided for in the national criminal codes of the 
respective states. 
Further, the convention does not explicitly recognize the fact 
that in time of war jurisdiction may be asserted by military courts 
or tribunals, or national courts;175 perhaps it was deemed too ob-
vious. The most common forum for the prosecution of individuals 
for war crimes is the military tribunal, either established interna-
tionally on the basis of universal jurisdiction or under the national 
laws of individual states, or the ordinary criminal courts.176 
The most favored view of jurisdiction over war crimes is that, 
as far as possible, national courts should adjudicate all war crimes 
coming within their respective territorial jurisdiction, 177 but allow-
ing for the universality theory to apply so that in the event a given 
state fails to exercise its primary right of prosecution and punish-
ment, another interested state could exercise jurisdiction. Certain 
categories of offenses should, however, be remitted to an interna-
tional criminal court either because they are international crimes 
resulted in the return of the object to the government of Cameroon. DESKBOOK, supra note 
6, at 71. 
175. After World War II, actions for the recovery of property were instituted both 
in the military courts set up by the occupying allies and the national courts, with considerable 
confusion concerning authority to assert jurisdiction. See supra note 59. 
176. This does not include the jurisdiction asserted by military tribunals. Court mar-
tials are limited to prosecution of persons currently in the armed forces and derive jurisdiction 
from the sovereign right of nations to raise and administer armies. See U .C.M.J., supra note 
14, 10 U.S.C. § 102, § 2802 art. 2 (1982). 
177. Witness, for example, the problems of the United States in prosecuting ex-
servicemen for crimes committP.d during the Korean and Viet Nam wars. See Note Jurisdic-
tional Problems Related to Prosecution of Former Servicemen for Violations of the Law of War, 
56 VA. L. REV. 947 (1970); Shaneyfelt, War Crimes and the Jurisdictional Maze, 4 INT'L LAW. 
924 (1970). One author has proposed a theory under which war crimes jurisdiction may be 
maintained in federal court. See Paust, After My Lai: The Case of War Crimes Jurisdiction 
Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6 (1971). See also supra note 14. 
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or because as transnational crimes they are more adequately and 
effectively dealt with by such a court. This is especially true when, 
for example, no national court has jurisdiction or when a state 
chooses not to exercise jurisdiction, or because the crime commit-
ted has an effect in more than one state or against the citizens of 
different states, or when the crime is committed by a head of state.178 
In order for national courts to exercise common judicial jurisdic-
tion under their general criminal laws, the provisions of the rele-
vant international conventions must first be incorporated into 
national penal codes. In the context of armed conflicts regulations, 
however, the provisions prohibiting destruction or confiscation of 
cultural property are subject to military law and are not subject 
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts.179 
Where jurisdiction cannot be asserted by a national court, 
states may resort to special military tribunals. In the end, however, 
both fora are limited by the general or special criminal jurisdic-
tion of the special military courts of the individual states. Thus, 
the convention is shortsighted in failing to provide alternative or 
contingent jurisdictional bases by which its provisions may be 
enforced. 
Finally, the convention fails to address jurisdiction over 
recovery and restitution of property through civil actions after 
cessation of hostilities. Significant problems lie in determining title 
once property has been confiscated and sold to bona fide third par-
ty purchasers. Without even a statement of policy regarding this 
issue, the convention leaves the individual states to provide their 
own solution. 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention180 sets forth three means by 
which illicit traffic in cultural property may be controlled. First, 
the parties are to set up national services. As appropriate for each 
178. Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report 
by the Int'l L. Comm. to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7. (May 27, 1949). See B. 
FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE (1980). For a draft 
statute creating an international criminal court for the enforcement of the Apartheid Con-
vention containing specific jurisdictional provisions, see U .N. Commission on Human Rights, 
The Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apar-
theid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments, E/CN.4/AC/22CRP.10/Rev.1 
(Dec. 10, 1980), reprinted in 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 523 (1981). 
179. See supra note 176. See also Baxter, Jurisdiction Over War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity: Individual and State Accountability, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NAN-
DA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 67 (1973). 
180. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1. 
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country, such services would include development of draft legisla-
tion to protect the cultural heritage and prevent illicit export and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property, and the establishment 
of ethical principles to guide transactions in cultural property .181 
Second, consistent with national legislation, the states are to pre-
vent the import and acquisition of illegally exported cultural prop-
erty from its eountry of origin.182 Third, states are to prohibit the 
export of cultural property from their territory unless accompanied 
by an export certificate.183 The convention provides for the imposi-
tion of penalties or administrative sanctions for violations of articles 
6(b) or 7(b), but otherwise generally provides only for the parties 
to oppose practices prohibited by the convention "within the means 
at their disposal." 184 A duty is imposed, as consistent with the laws 
of each state, to admit actions for recovery brought by the rightful 
owners of cultural property.185 
It is very clear that the UNESCO Convention speaks exclusive-
ly of territoriality of jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the term 
"jurisdiction" in international law refers to two aspects of the 
authoritative decision-making process: rule-making and 
rule-enforcing.186 States are competent to declare conduct violative 
of their interests and, therefore, punish all offenses committed 
within their territory. The question is whether the two aspects of 
jurisdiction must co-exist concurrently within a state. 
The UNESCO Convention appears to vest the power to 
legislate concerning protection of cultural property in the individual 
state (rule-making); however, the convention does not clearly vest 
the power to enforce in any state (rule-enforcing). Even if not ex-
pressly stated, the result is at least an implicit conflict between 
the power of rule-making and the power of rule-enforcing. It is in-
teresting to note that with respect to the United States-Mexico 
treaty and enforcement thereof in recent decisions by the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits,187 the U.S. Courts of Appeal have, in effect, inter-
preted the treaty to vest the power to legislate in the country of 
origin of the cultural property, while the right of ownership is to 
181. Id. arts. 5(a), 5(e). 
182. Id. art. 7. 
183. Id. art. 6. 
184. Id. art. 2(2). 
185. Id. art. 13(b). 
186. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7. 
187. See supra note 105. 
38
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss2/3
318 Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 10:281 
be enforced in the territory in which the object is located or in which 
the prohibited act was committed.188 
Last, but not least, is the important, but overlooked, fact that 
most states will not enforce the penal judgments of another state189 
unl~ss a convention specifically establishes that duty .190 The absence 
of a clear statement in the relevant peacetime conventions on the 
recognition and enforcement of penal judgments renders the en-
forceability of these judgments questionable and, thus, reduces 
the impact of the convention with respect to the prevention, sup-
pression and control of the activity sought to be internationally 
prohibited. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The distinction made between relevant international in-
struments in their applicability to the contexts of war and peace 
is inappropriate to the effective enforcement of a common interest, 
based on the shared values and expectations of the world community 
which are presumably embodied in all these instruments. The con-
sequences of this distinction are that certain violations are deemed 
international crimes while others are not specifically deemed to be 
so. The legal distinction, in turn, produces significant differences 
with respect to enforcement, and that in large part, is reflected in 
the jurisdictional bases set forth explicitly or implicitly in these 
instruments. These instruments are either too limited or too am-
biguous regarding their intended enforcement. This is evidenced 
by the criminal jurisdictional problems discussed above. 
A consequence of this situation is the diversity of eventually 
competent jurisdictions (i.e., an international criminal court, national 
military tribunals, national criminal or civil courts). Another con-
sequence appears in the enforcement schemes, means, and methods 
188. See supra note 102. 'I'he McClain courts asserted a Mexican law as the basis for 
establishing that the property in question was stolen within the meaning of the National 
Stolen Property Act. See also King of Italy v. Marquis de Medici, 34 T.L.R. 632 (1918), wherein 
the English court gave extraterritorial effect to an Italian law protecting the Italian 
patrimony. 
189. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66 (1825); but see Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 
F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975) and Von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Penal Judgments in the 
United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977). See also Bassiouni, Perspectives on the Transfer of 
Prisoners Between the U.S. a,nd Mexico and the U.S. and Canada, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 249 (1978); Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Prisoners by the U.S. under the Ex-
change of Prisoner Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING THE U.S. 
LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (R.B. Lillich ed. 1981). 
190. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 
15 CASE w. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983). 
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(i.e., duty to prosecute or extradite, and lend judicial assistance and 
cooperation). Finally, a difference also exists with respect to pros-
ecutable offenses and offenders in these differing contexts before 
multiple potentially competent fora. 
In light of the observations made above, which are by no means 
exhaustive, the following recommendations are offered: 
(1) The adoption of a comprehensive unified convention deal-
ing with all aspects and types of protection of cultural property, 
irrespective of context. It should contain an appropriate differen-
tiation between types of offenses, their definition (with a view to 
preserving the principles of legality embodied in the maxim nulla 
poere sine lege191), a statement of other able jurisdictional bases, with 
a priority ranking to settle conflicts of judicial jurisdiction, and pro-
visions providing for the duty to prosecute or extradite and the 
establishment of a duty to lend judicial assistance and cooperation 
in the investigation, prosecution, and enforcement of the provisions 
of the convention and enforcement of the judgments of competent 
tribunals, including recognition of foreign penal judgments.192 
(2) The drafting of model national legislation to implement such 
a convention for inclusion into the national laws of the interested 
states. This would provide greater uniformity of application and 
enhance enforcement.193 
Almost all of the twenty-o~e recorded civilizations of this planet 
have had some form of cultural property the heritage or legacy of 
which has been received and transmitted for the enrichment of en-
suing civilizations, and the enlightenment of succeeding generations. 
Yet curiously that which appears most commonly shared through 
191. M.C. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LA w 52 (1978), cited by the Supreme Court 
in Kolender v. Lawson, 51 U.S.L.W. 4532, 4533 (1983). 
192. See, e.g., European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, 
May 29, 1970, Europ.T.S. 70. See also EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL VALIDITY 
OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS (1970); Harari, McLean & Silverwood, Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Criminal Judgments, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 585; Shearer, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Judgments, 47 AUST. L.J. 585 (1973); Breukelaar, La 
Reconaissance des Jugements Repressifs Etrangers, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 
565 (1974); Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments and Their Enforcement, in II M.C. 
BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261 (1973). 
193. This recommendation was attempted in connection with the enforcement of the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.l.A.S. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 
(effective June 24, 1967), and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, done Feb. 21, 1971, 
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.58/6, T.l.A.S. 9725 (effective July 15, 1980), reprinted in 10 l.L.M. 261 
(1971), and was included in workpaper: International Drug Control, Abidaja World Conference 
on World Peace Through Law, Aug. 26, 1973. See also Bassiouni, The International Narcotics 
Control System: A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1972). 
40
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss2/3
320 Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 10:281 
the ages in all parts of the globe, and that which is universally 
perceived as deserving the highest protection seems to have been 
the object of so little effective concern by the world community. 
Perhaps it is as the cynics of the post-Napoleonic period argued 
after the Paris Conference of 1815, that if such treasures belong 
to the world and thus need to be preserved, why not keep them 
in Paris where so many more people from many parts of the world 
are likely to see and enjoy them? Perhaps it is because that which 
is of perservable value to some, is of attractive, sometimes destruc-
tible, appeal to others. But perhaps, too, the realization that our 
planet is the "spaceship-earth" is what it takes to bring about a 
true sharing of the values of protecting and preserving the cultural 
heritage of all peoples, not only for purely national or chauvinistic 
purposes, but for the inherent interest that we all share in each 
other's culture, now and for ensuing generations of this, and perhaps 
succeeding civilizations, if our planet survives the test of our 
destructive tendencies. 
APPENDIX 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 
Presented to the Vlth U .N. Congress on Crime Prevention 
and the Treatment of Offenders, (Caracas, Venezuela, 1980) 
U.N. Doc. No. E/1980/L.l 
Article XVII. Theft of National and Archaeological Treasures 
Section 1. Definition 
1.1 Cultural property is any property which, on religious or 
secular grounds, is designated by a state as being of importance to 
its cultural heritage and which belongs to the following categories: 
(a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals 
and anatomy, and objects of paleontological interest; 
(b) property relating to history, including the history of 
science and technology and military and social history, to the life 
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of national leaders, thinkers, scientists, and artists, and to events 
of national importance; 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular 
and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or ar-
chaeological sites which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as in-
scriptions, coins, and engraved seals; 
(f) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g) property of artistic interest, including, but not limited to: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely 
by hand on any support and in any material (ex-
cluding industrial designs and manufactured arti-
cles decorated by hand); 
(ii) original works of statutary art and sculpture in any 
material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints, and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any 
material; 
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents, 
and publications of special interest, singly or in collections; 
(i) postage, revenue, and similar stamps, singly or in 
collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and 
cinematographic archives; 
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and 
old musical instruments. 
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1.2 Property which belongs to the following categories shall 
be deemed part of the cultural heritage of a state: 
(a) cultural property created by the individual or collective 
genius of nationals of the state concerned, and cultural property 
of importance to the state concerned created within the territory 
of that state by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident 
within such t,erritory; 
(b) cultural property found within the national territory of 
a state; 
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological 
or natural science missions, with the consent of the competent 
authorities of the state of origin of such property; 
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely 
agreed exchange; 
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally 
with the consent of the competent authorities of the state of origin 
of such property. 
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Section 2. Acts of Theft of National and Archaeological Treasures 
2.0 Theft of national and archaeological treasures shall con-
sist of: 
(a) the import, export, or transfer of ownership of cultural 
property effected contrary to the provisions adopted by a state 
to promote the enforcement of this Article; 
(b) the export and transfer of cultural property under com-
pulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a state 
by a foreign power; 
(c) the importation of cultural property stolen from a 
museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar in-
stitution of a state, provided that such property is documented as 
appertaining to the inventory of that institution. 
Section 3. Recovery 
3.0 Recovery of cultural property shall only be by those lawful 
means provided for in international conventions on this subject and 
any other relevant convention, but such recovery shall not be 
deemed a seizure and just compensation shall be owed to the bona 
fide holder. 
Section 4. Specified Measures of Enforcement 
4.1 Each exporting state shall establish an appropriate cer-
tificate which would specify that the export of the cultural prop-
erty in question is authorized by that state. The certificate should 
accompany all items of cultural property exported in accordance 
with this Section. 
Section 2. Each state shall prohibit exportation of cultural prop-
erty from their territory unless accompanied by the export cer-
tificate mentioned in Section 4.1. 
4.3 Each state shall publicize by appropriate means the re-
quirements of this Section, particularly to those persons or entities 
likely to engage in the import or export of cultural property. 
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